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Abstract 
With the increasing international financial and economic integration, sovereign credit ratings have become one of the most 
important elements in directing global capital flows. Effects of credit rating agencies on both sovereign economies and the global 
economy have increased. On the other hand, CRAs have been heavily criticized for their poor performance in the crises of 1990s 
and the recent global financial crisis that started in 2008. 
The aim of this study is to examine the systematic and consistency of sovereign credit ratings given by CRAs and to identify the 
determinants of sovereign credit ratings. As a result of panel data analysis conducted by reverse engineering methodology within 
this context, GDP per capita, governance quality, current account balance, growth performance and growth expectations, being an 
industrialized country and having a reserve currency were identified as factors affecting sovereign credit rating positively. On the 
other hand; exchange rate volatility, interest payments, debt stock and default occurrences were the factors effecting credit ratings 
negatively.  
The findings of the analyses support the critiques against CRAs about being unable to foresee the economic crises and about 
deepening the existing crises by making sudden rating cuts. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the globalization and deepening of financial markets, a saver in one part of the world can make a loan to a 
borrower in another part of the world with different kinds of financial tools and intermediaries. On the other hand, it 
is impossible for lenders to have full information of all the borrowers in the world about their financial positions. For 
ensuring the sustainability and the continuation of confidence in financial markets, investors should know borrowers' 
capacity to fulfill their obligations and the existing risks. This need creates a new business and raises the demand for 
© 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences.
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credit rating agencies (CRAs).  As their role, CRAs has become the routers of the global capital with international 
financial integration and globalization. Taking in to account that investors match sovereign credit risk with country 
risk and 25 percent of the non-US companies rated by CRAs are in the developing countries, the importance and 
effects of CRAs increases (Setty and Dodd, 2003:14). To emphasize the impact of CRAs on world economy and 
politics Friedman (1995) indicates that “you could almost say that we live again in a two-superpower world. There is 
the U.S. and there is Moody's. The U.S. can destroy a country by leveling it with bombs; Moody's can destroy a country 
by downgrading its bonds”. 
Although there are many publications about credit ratings in the literature, researches on this topic has also increased 
along with the increasing financial integration, especially since the 1990s. Asian and Russian financial crises in the 
late 1990s and European debt crisis following the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008, has made CRAs and 
credit ratings debatable. It is expressed widely in the literature that grades given by the CRAs remains far from 
reflecting the real risk perception of the countries. 
CRAs which have been operating for more than 100 years in financial markets, has been the subject of criticism for 
many reasons. The recent global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 has led to a further increase in the dose of these 
criticisms. Since it became evident that the bonds of companies and governments with high credit ratings carry high 
risk, the reliability of the ratings given by the CRAs began to be questioned. These critics can be summarized as 
follows; 
x The grading method of CRAs is not sufficiently transparent, 
x Lack of competition in credit rating market, 
x Conflicts of interests because of income model of CRAs, 
x Failure of CRA’s to anticipate the crisis and their further deepening of current ones.  
In this context, this paper aims to scrutinize the determinants of sovereign credit ratings by making reverse 
engineering and to question the consistency of CRAs by making country comparative analysis. Panel data analysis is 
used to analyze credit ratings of 69 countries given by Moody’s with related economic and social data of 1996-2012 
period.  
2. DATA, MODEL AND METHOD  
Rating agencies take into account a lot of factors to determine the sovereign credit rating of a country. In the 
documents published by CRAs, numerous economic, political and social factors are listed to underlie their sovereign 
credit ratings. In this paper, based on previous studies and Moody’s Rating Methodology (2013) document, thirteen 
economic and six governance indicators and three dummy variables are used to predict sovereign credit ratings (Table 
1). In order to include countries as much as possible, annual data after between 1996 and 2012 is used. Concerning the 
lag between the realization and announcement of economic data and the correlation between the ratings and economy, 
one year lag data are used to predict sovereign credit ratings. Stata 11.1 statistical program is used for econometric 
calculations, significance tests and predictions in panel data analysis. 
 
Table 1. List of the variables used in the study and their sources 
Variable Source 
Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Rule of Law: Percentile Rank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Real GDP Per Capita, USD Dolar World Development Indicators 
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GDP (PPP) Share of World Total, Percent* IMF World Economic Outlook 
Inflation, Percent  IMF World Economic Outlook 
GDP Growth, Percent World Development Indicators 
Current Account Balance, Percent of GDP IMF World Economic Outlook 
Trade openness†, Percent World Development Indicators 
General Government Gross Debt (%of GDP) IMF World Economic Outlook 
Last 4 Years Average GDP Growth, Percent World Development Indicators 
One Year Growth Forecast, Percent IMF World Economic Outlook 
Exchange Rate Volatility IMF International Financial Indicators 
Default History‡ Moody's Sovereign Default and Recovery Rates (2013) 
In the list of the countries that are analyzed in this study, there are developed countries such as; UK, Germany, 
Canada and France; and developing countries such as Turkey, Indonesia and Argentina. Additionally, there exist big 
economies such as China and US besides the small economies such as Panama, Malta and Trinidad Tobago. The 
sovereign ratings of Moody’s which are used as the dependent variable of the analysis, is quantified as the highest 
rating “Aaa” corresponding to 22 and the lowest rating “WR” (withdrawn rating) corresponding to 1, in accordance 
with the previous studies in the literature.  
 
Table 2. List of countries included in the analysis 
Argentina Cyprus India Lithuania Peru Sweden 
Australia Czech Republic Indonesia Luxembourg Philippines Switzerland 
Austria Denmark Ireland Malaysia Poland Thailand 
Belgium Egypt Israel Malta Portugal Trinidad and Tobago 
Bolivia El Salvador Italy Mexico Qatar Turkey 
Brazil Estonia Japan Morocco Romania United Kingdom 
Bulgaria Finland Jordan Netherlands Russia United States 
Canada France Kazakhstan New Zealand Singapore Uruguay 
Chile Germany Korea Norway Slovak Republic Venezuela 
China Greece Kuwait Oman Slovenia  
Colombia Hungary Latvia Pakistan South Africa  
Croatia Iceland Lebanon Panama Spain  
 
In this study, taking into account the previous studies, panel data method is used to establish country comparison 
analysis in addition to solve the limited time period problem at the same time. By combining time series of cross 
section observations, panel data gives more information, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more 
 
 
* GDP World share is multiplied by Real GDP Per Capita to create a new data called adjusted GDP per capita. Since Moody’s mentions in its 
rating methodology that the scale of the country economy is an important factor for ratings, it reflects both income level and scale of the economy 
in a single parameter.  
† Trade openness is calculated as the share of total trade (exports and imports) in GDP. As trade openness increases it is expected that the country 
is more willing to meet its obligations to maintain its credibility.  
‡ Based on previous studies, credit defaults are included in the model with a dummy variable  which shows whather a country lived any default 
in the past 20 year or not. 
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degrees of freedom and more efficiency Baltagi (1995). For prediction of credit ratings, the model below which 
includes both time and cross section dimension is used. 
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eit = μi + vi 
 
 
 
Consider the multiple linear regression model in Equation (1), for country i = 1, ..., N which is observed at several 
time periods t = 1, ..., T where Yit is the dependent variable, credit rating of country, Xkit is a K-dimensional row vector 
of time-varying explanatory variables. Ⱦ଴ is the intercept, β is a K-dimensional column vector of parameters.  eit 
interprets the error term which is accepted to have zero average and constant variance where μi is an individual-specific 
effect and vi is an idiosyncratic error term.  
Panel data models examine cross-sectional (group) and/or time-series (time) effects. These effects may be fixed 
and/or random. Fixed effects assume that individual group/time have different intercept in the regression equation, 
while random effects hypothesize individual group/time have different disturbance (Park 2010). 
In this study, related tests are applied to data incrementally to find the best estimator for prediction of sovereign 
credit ratings. Firstly, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator used and its results are shown in the Table 8. Then, to 
determine whether group effect model is better than the pooled OLS model, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
test is applied. LM test for random effects in a linear model is based on pooled OLS residuals, while estimation of the 
alternative model involves generalized least squares either based on a two-step procedure or maximum likelihood 
(Green and McKenzie). The LM test helps you decide whether using a random effects regression on a simple OLS 
regression. The null hypothesis in the LM test is that variance across entities is zero which means no significant 
difference across units. Looking at the Table3, there is statistically significant evidence for differences across units.   
 
Table 3. Breusch-Pagan LM Test Results 
  Model 1 
Chi2(65)   25978.61 
 Prob> Chi2 0.00 
 H0: Var (u) = 0   
To decide between a random effects and fixed effects model, researchers often rely on the Hausman specification. 
The Hausman test is designed to detect violation of the random effects modeling assumption that the explanatory 
variables are orthogonal to the unit effects. If there is no correlation between the independent variable(s) and the unit 
effects, then estimates of β in the fixed effects model should be similar to estimates of β in the random effects model 
(Clark and Linzer: 2012). If the null hypothesis is rejected, a random effect model will be suffering from the violation 
of the Gauss Markov theorem and end up with biased and inconsistent estimates; by contrast, a fixed effect model still 
remains unbiased and consistent (Park 2010). According to the results of Hausman test in Table 4, fixed effects should 
be used to predict credit ratings. 
 
Table 4. Hausman Test Results 
  Model 2 
Chi2 (19)  143.78 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 
 H0: Both of these estimators are consistent 
i 1,2,..., N;    t 1,2,...,T  
2( ) 0  ve  ( )it itE e Var e HV  
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Applying fixed effects to Model 2 give the results of Model 3 in Table 8. Concerning that Model 3 does not include 
fixed effects in time dimension, F test is applied to determine the significance of fixed effects in time dimension. 
Analyzing the F test results in Table 5, it is seen that there is fixed time effect in the panel data.  
 
Table 5. F test Results  
  Model 3 
Chi2 (16)   2.49 
 Prob > Chi2 0.0019 
H0: all u_i=0 
Model 3, which includes fixed effects bot in cross-section and time dimension, is tested for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation alternately. If one relaxes the usual hypotheses of well-behaved, white noise errors and allows for the 
idiosyncratic error εit being arbitrarily heteroskedastic and serially correlated over time, a more general kind of feasible 
GLS is needed, called the unrestricted or general GLS (Croissant and Millo, 2008). Wooldridge (2011) suggests that 
in a panel data which cross section is larger than the time series, using clustered robust standard errors will solve both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. Allowing for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of unknown 
form, the asymptotic variance can be consistently estimated with the so-called cluster-robust covariance estimator 
treating each individual as a cluster (Schmidheiny, 2014).  
 
Table 6.  Wald Test Results 
  Model 3  
 Chi2 (65)  25978.61 
 Prob> Chi2 0.00 
H0: Var(ui) = σ2   
 
Table 7. Wooldridge Autocorrelation Test Results 
  Model 3  
 F(  1,      61)  1.474 
Prob > F 0.2297 
H0: No first-order autocorrelation  
Taking into account the autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems, Model 3 evolved to Model 4 which has 
clustered robust estimators includes fixed effects both in cross section and time series (FE*) to give the most consistent 
results figured at Table 8.   
 
Table 8. S&P Sovereign Rating Predictions 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (OLS) (RE) (FE) (FE*) 
Rule of Law 0.0404** 0.0672** 0.0822* 0.112** 
 (0.0184) (0.0267) (0.0427) (0.0144) 
Regulatory Quality 0.00696 0.00457 -0.0289  
 (0.0475) (0.0540) (0.0603)  
Voice and Accountability 0.0209 0.0826* 0.141**  
 (0.0397) (0.0481) (0.0567)  
Control of Corruption 0.0417 0.136*** 0.184***  
 (0.0374) (0.0444) (0.0510)  
Government Effectiveness 0.238*** 0.107* 0.123* 0.187** 
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 (0.0543) (0.0620) (0.0737) (0.0914) 
Political Stability -0.0140 -0.00532 -0.0151  
 (0.0120) (0.0157) (0.0195)  
Average (4 Years) Growth Rate  1.536*** 1.642*** 1.380*** 0.799** 
 (0.336) (0.310) (0.338) (0.382) 
Next Year Growth Forecast -0.607 0.755** 1.205*** 1.391** 
 (0.419) (0.355) (0.360) (0.690) 
Current Account Balance(t-1) 0.589*** 0.399*** 0.344*** 0.292** 
 (0.0984) (0.115) (0.131) (0.064) 
Exchange Rate Volatility(t-1) -0.124*** -0.0455 0.00409 -0.0365 
 (0.0298) (0.0420) (0.0507) (0.0247) 
Inflation(t-1) -0.793*** -0.661*** -0.631*** -0.873*** 
 (0.221) (0.201) (0.210) (0.154) 
Adjusted GDP per Capita(t-1) 0.0731*** 0.0744*** 0.0160 0.212** 
 (0.00957) (0.0168) (0.0585) (0.0814) 
Debt Stock / GDP(t-1) -0.200*** -0.348*** -0.575*** -0.578*** 
 
(0.0392) (0.0655) (0.100) (0.107) 
Trade Openness(t-1) -0.0400*** -0.0224 0.0522  
 
(0.0139) (0.0239) (0.0458)  
Net Lending / GDP(t-1) -0.294*** -0.176 -0.165  
 
(0.106) (0.123) (0.134)  
Capital Investments/GDP(t-1) 0.133*** 0.212*** 0.209*** 0.133** 
 
(0.0357) (0.0442) (0.0554) (0.0579) 
Interest Payments/Revenues(t-1) -0.625*** -0.155 -0.0302  
 
(0.121) (0.163) (0.225)  
Default History -0.218*** -0.178*** -0.175*** -0.115* 
 
(0.0186) (0.0235) (0.0292) (0.0890) 
Reserve Currency 0.0982*** 0.120*** 0.0836 0.0633** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0398) (0.0515) (0.0304) 
Industrial Countr 0.0538 0.0601** 0.0848*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.0360) (0.0303) (0.0312) (0.0382) 
Costant Term 0.539*** -0.104 -0.149 -0.718 
 
(0.174) (0.240) (0.611) (0.956) 
Number of Observations 868 868 868 868 
R2 0.824 0.805 0.826 0.808 
Number of Countries 69 69 69 69 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are standard error terms 
*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 
According to results of Model 4, rule of law and government effectiveness, among the governance indicators, are 
the statistically significant determinants of sovereign credit ratings. Average growth rate of last four years, GDP 
growth forecast of next year, current account balance, adjusted GDP per capita, capital investments are the economic 
factors that positively affect credit ratings. On the other hand, exchange rate volatility, debt stock/GDP ratio and 
inflation are the negative factors affecting the credit ratings. Also, it is observed that having a reserve currency and 
being an industrialized economy increases the ratings while having a default has a negative impact on credit ratings. 
Although there are other variables in the model, they lost their significance after using clustered robust estimators to 
solve autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems.  
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Fig. 1. Percentage weight of sovereign rating determinants for 2012  
Source: Model prediction results 
Scrutinizing the contributions of determinants to sovereign credit rating in the model, it is seen that adjusted GDP 
per capita (GDP per capita multiplied by the world GDP share of country) is the most important factor for credit rating. 
This is consistent with previous studies and Moody’s rating criteria since it shows the economic and technological 
development of the countries. Also, the governance indicators of government effectiveness and rule of law has a big 
impact on predicted ratings.  
Despite Model 4 includes data of 69 countries, it was possible to get estimates for the 53 countries due to the lack 
of data for 2012. In the Table 9, there are credit ratings given by Moody’s and estimated by Model 4 for 2012. 
Analyzing the results in the Table 9, it is seen that Model predictions and the real Moody’s ratings are same for 19 
countries (Germany, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Philippines, Croatia, Lithuania, Hungary, Mexico, Malta, Norway, 
Pakistan, Peru, Slovakia, Singapore, New Zealand, Jordan, Sweden, Switzerland). Assuming that one point grade is 
the Model’s error margin, nearly 70 percent of the grades are consistent with the Moody’s grades.  
 
Table 9. Moody’s Credit Ratings and Model predictions for 2012 
COUNTRY
  
MOODY’S PREDICTION COUNTRY
  
MOODY’S PREDICTION 
US Aaa Aa1 Canada Aaa Aa2 
Germany Aaa Aaa Kazakhistan Baa2 Ba1 
Australia Aaa Aaa Latvia Baa3 Baa1 
Austria Aaa Aa3 Lithuanian Baa1 Baa1 
Belgium Aa3 A2 Hungary Ba1 Ba1 
Brazil Baa2 Baa2 Malaysia A3 A2 
Bulgaria Baa2 Baa2 Malta A3 A3 
Czech Rep. A1 A2 Mexico A3 A3 
China Aa3 A3 Egypt Baa2 Baa1 
Indonesia Baa3 Ba1 Norway Aaa Aaa 
Estonia A1 Aa2 Pakistan Caa1 Caa1 
Morocco Ba1 Ba2 Panama Baa2 A2 
Philippines Ba1 Ba1 Peru Baa2 Baa2 
G overnment 
E fectiveness
16%
R ule of Law
10%
Next Y ear G rowth 
F orecast
6%
Average (4 Y ears) 
G rowth R ate 
6%
C urrent Account 
B alance
9%
E xchange R ate 
V olatility
6%
Inflation
6%
Adjusted G D P  per 
C apita 
21%
D ebt S tock/G D P
11%
C apital Investments
9%
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Finland Aaa Aa2 Poland A2 Baa1 
France Aa1 Aa2 Portugal Ba3 Baa3 
South Africa Baa1 Baa2 Rumania Baa3 Ba1 
South Korea Aa3 Aa2 Singapore Aaa Aaa 
Croatia Baa3 Baa3 Slovakia A2 A2 
Netherlands Aaa Aa3 Slovenia Baa2 A2 
England Aaa Aa2 Thailand Baa1 Ba1 
Ireland Ba1 Baa1 Tunis Baa3 Ba1 
Spain Baa3 Baa1 Turkey Ba1 Baa2 
Israel A1 A2 Jordan Ba2 Ba2 
Swedish Aaa Aaa Venezuela B2 B3 
Swiss Aaa Aaa New Zealand Aaa Aaa 
Italy Baa2 Baa3 Greece C B2 
Japan Aa3 A3       
Source: Moody’s, Model predictions 
Comparing the notes of the Model and Moody’s for the same countries for 2007 before the global financial crisis, 
it is seen that there is much more consistency between the Model and Moody’s (Table 10). Predicted ratings of 25 
countries are same as Moody’s in 2007. Evaluating the results for 2007 in one point error margin nearly 80 percent of 
the grades are consistent with each other. It is suggested that this fact is the result of the financial crisis which occurred 
in 2008 and have still negative impacts on further predictions of the Model.   
 
Table 10. Moody’s credit ratings and model predictions for 2007 
COUNTRY
  
MOODY’S PREDICTION COUNTRY
  
MOODY’S PREDICTION 
US Aaa Aaa Kazakhistan Baa2 Ba1 
Germany Aaa Aa1 Colombia Baa3 Ba1 
Australia Aaa Aaa Kuwait AA- AA+ 
Austria Aaa Aaa Latvia A2 Aa3 
Belgium Aa1 Aa3 Lithuanian A AA- 
Brazil Ba1 Ba2 Hungary A2 Baa1 
Bulgaria Baa3 Baa3 Malaysia A3 A3 
Czech Rep. A1 Aa2 Malta A2 A2 
China A1 Baa2 Mexico Baa1 Baa1 
El Salvador BB+ BB+ Eygpt Baa3 B2 
Indonesia Ba3 Ba3 Norway Aaa Aaa 
Estonia A1 Aaa Pakistan B1 B3 
Philippines B1 Ba3 Panama Ba1 Baa2 
Finland Aaa Aaa Peru Ba2 Ba1 
France Aaa Aaa Poland A2 A2 
South Africa Baa1 Baa1 Portugal Aa2 A1 
South Korea A2 Aa1 Rumania Baa3 Baa1 
Croatia Baa1 A3 Singapore Aaa Aaa 
Netherlands Aaa Aaa Slovakia A1 Aa2 
England Aaa Aaa Slovenia Aa2 Aaa 
Ireland Aaa Aaa Thailand Baa1 Baa3 
Spain Aaa Aaa Tunis Baa2 Baa2 
Israel A2 A2 Turkey Ba3 Baa2 
Swedish Aaa Aaa Jordan Ba2 Ba2 
Swiss Aaa Aaa Venezuela B2 B1 
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Italy Aa2 A3 New Zealand Aaa Aaa 
Japan Aaa A3 Greece A1 Baa1 
Canada Aaa Aaa       
Source: Moody’s, Model predictions 
A noticeable point in the model results for 2007 is notes of developed countries are more likely to approach Moody's 
ratings while the Model gives higher ratings compared to Moody's to less developed and small countries such as 
Romania, Croatia, Panama and Lithuania.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Netherland’s Credit Rating  
Source: Moody’s, Model predictions 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Austria’s Credit Rating  
Source: Moody’s, Model predictions 
Analyzing the Figures above, the reason of difference in results for 2012 and 2017 become clearer. Although the 
Model underestimates ratings for some countries, especially in Europe, due to the decreasing growth rates and 
increasing debt stocks, Moody’s continues to give high credit ratings to those countries during the financial crisis and 
following European debt crisis. For most European countries such as France, Ireland and UK the situation is similar. 
The Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the credit rating history of Greece and Portugal which support the critiques towards 
credit rating agencies, especially in Greece case. Comparing the ratings of Moody’s and Model predictions, it can be 
seen that Model never suggests high ratings as Moody’s until 2010 for Greece. The rating path of the Model for Greece 
is very different from Moody’s’ announced grades. The Model suggest a gradual 8 point rating cuts between 2006 and 
2012 due to the worsening economic conditions. On the other hand, Moody’s insists to give high ratings for Greece 
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until 2009 and decreases the rating by 15 points in a less than one year period. This supports the claim that CRAs 
cannot foresee the coming crisis and they deepen the existing ones. Argitis and Nikolaidi (2011) mention that CRAs 
played a Ponzi game in 1990s and beginning of 2000s and they describe the period after 2003 as Ultra-Ponzi game. 
The authors have the same view that CRAs give extra high credit ratings to Greece until 2009, so that Greece could 
borrow easily to rollover its debt. But this caused an extra increase in the debt stock of Greece, which would take 
precautions against it conversely, and resulted with a financial collapse.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Greece’s Credit Rating 
Source: Moody’s, Model predictions 
 
Fig 5. Portugal’s Credit Rating 
Source: Moody’s, Model predictions 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
CRAs were criticized for their poor performance in the crisis during end of 20th century. The critiques towards 
CRAs are increasing further after the global financial and following European debt crises. As world economies, 
especially emerging ones are in need of considerable amount of external financing to accelerate economic growth 
process, healthy analysis of CRAs and their credit rating methodologies is of critical importance.  
As a result of panel data analysis conducted by reverse engineering methodology; GDP per capita, governance 
quality, current account balance, growth performance and growth expectations, being an industrialized country and 
having a reserve currency were identified as factors affecting sovereign credit rating positively. On the other hand; 
exchange rate volatility, interest payments, debt stock and default occurrences were the factors effecting credit ratings 
negatively.  
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The findings of the analyses support the critiques against CRAs about being unable to foresee the economic crises 
and about deepening the existing crises by making sudden rating cuts. Rating history of Greece is the most significant 
example of the critiques for CRAs. Analyzing economic and social data of Greece and many other countries, it is 
observed that Moody’s does not give ratings according its rating manuals every time. The ratings do not reflect the 
real economic and social position of countries. Taking into account that ratings and rating criteria of Moody’s are 
similar with other big CRAs such as S&P and Fitch Ratings, CRAs should be loyal to their criteria while determining 
the sovereign ratings to maintain their reputation which is the only asset they have.  
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